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Abstract: We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our 
understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field 
initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations 
of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral 
evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these 
threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of moral 
judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with 
rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence 
can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy 
moral development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Imagine reading in the news about a country far, far away that won’t admit poor, 
helpless, asylum-seeking refugees. “That’s just wrong,” you think. Yet your 
neighbor passionately draws the opposite conclusion. In this way, humans are able 
to judge actions to be right or wrong and people to be good or evil, even if those 
criticized (or praised) are “third parties” with no connection to the individual 
making the judgment. Another interesting feature of moral judgment is that, even 
if it usually motivates one to follow it, the corresponding action often fails to 
materialize. Many people lie, cheat, and steal yet feel guilty afterward because they 
believe such acts are immoral. So, while human moral psychology has many 
components—including motivation, decision, and action—our focus is on moral 
judgment specifically.  
How does this capacity arise in the brain? In this chapter, we identify and 
weave together some of the major threads of research emerging over the past 30 
years, before discussing future directions. We’ll explain how the first thread in the 
neuroscience of moral judgment focused on brain abnormalities, from lesion 
studies to disorders such as psychopathy. Early research (ca. 1990-2000) 
concentrated on the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which led to 
theories emphasizing gut feelings as integral to moral judgment. The second thread 
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(ca. 2000-2010) ushered in new methods, especially brain imaging, brain 
stimulation, and neurotransmitter manipulations. Moral neuroscience highlighted 
brain areas associated with complex computation and reasoning, such as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the temporal parietal 
junction(TPJ)/posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). Theorists introduced dual 
process models to explain how both gut feelings and conscious deliberation 
influence moral cognition. More recent trends have drawn more on animal models 
and computational mechanisms to develop theories of moral learning in terms of 
reward and valuation. We expect the future will include more work on how brain 
development from childhood to adolescence relates to moral cognition.  
Ultimately we’ll see that neuroscience, when combined with findings from 
psychology and allied disciplines, helps to address perennial philosophical 
questions about moral judgment, particularly the possibility and limits of knowing 
right from wrong. By helping to uncover the neural circuits and neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying mature moral cognition, how it normally develops, and 
how it breaks down in pathology, neuroscience sheds light on the trustworthiness 
of our moral judgments and the possibility and shape of moral progress. It’s by no 
means easy to bridge the dreaded gap between how we do form our moral beliefs 
and how we ought to. Nevertheless, with caution and critical reflection, 
neuroscience can enrich our understanding of moral judgment and when it works 
well or poorly. 
 
2. First Thread: Gut Feelings 
 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, scientists and physicians inferred brain function 
primarily by examining patients with brain abnormalities, whether due to freak 
accidents, genetic anomalies, neurosurgery to treat debilitating seizures, or diseases 
like herpes that can damage the nervous system. When lesions disrupted patients’ 
moral capacities, researchers inferred that the affected brain area facilitates the 
corresponding capacity.  
 
1.1 Somatic Markers 
The most famous, even if poorly documented, case is that of Phineas Gage. In 1848, 
while working on a railroad in Vermont, an explosive accident catapulted a 3-foot 
iron rod up through Gage’s left cheek and out the top of his head. Remarkably, he 
survived, but his personality reportedly changed so much that he was virtually 
unrecognizable as his former self. Unfortunately, there is little reliable, 
corroborating evidence about the details of Gage’s case (Macmillan 2000), but 
some of the changes were ostensibly apparent in his moral character. He reportedly 
became more impulsive, vulgar, rash, and even childish.  
Although the affected brain area is difficult to pinpoint precisely, Gage 
seemed to suffer significant damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), which overlaps with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) behind the eyes 
(“orbits”). We know much more now about individuals with damage to this area in 
adulthood. Patients allegedly develop what Antonio Damasio (1994) dubbed 
“acquired sociopathy.” The label is misleading, though, because the psychological 
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profile of patients with vmPFC lesions is hardly similar to that of psychopaths (or 
what are sometimes referred to colloquially as “sociopaths”). Unlike individuals 
considered psychopathic, adults with vmPFC lesions are not callous, antisocial, or 
remorseless, but instead demonstrate a shortage of gut feelings that help guide 
decisions about what to do in the moment. Physiological measures suggest these 
patients, relative to controls, show diminished emotional responses when making a 
wide range of decisions, not just about how to treat others but even how to get 
points in a card game or where to eat for dinner. Patients with vmPFC damage 
generally give normal responses to questions about how various hypothetical 
choices should be resolved, including moral dilemmas (Saver & Damasio 1991), 
but they struggle to make decisions about what to do oneself in a particular 
situation (Kennett & Fine 2008). A patient might recognize it’s impolite to talk 
about gory injuries at dinner, but does that mean the hilarious hiking story is off the 
table? Damasio attributes this deficit in decision-making to an underlying 
impairment of “somatic markers” that guide everyday decisions about how to 
behave. Without the relevant gut feelings, patients are able “to know but not to 
feel,” as Damasio puts it (1994: 45).  
 
1.2 Psychopathy 
A more deviant example of abnormal moral thought and behavior lies in 
psychopathy. Psychopaths are characteristically callous, remorseless, 
manipulative, pompous, and exhibit superficial charm, among other similar vices 
that often leave injured or indigent victims in their wake (Hare 1993). Unlike 
“acquired sociopathy,” individuals with psychopathy exhibit abnormal functioning 
in the vmPFC and amygdala (and their connectivity), along with other paralimbic 
areas associated with gut feelings (Blair 2007; Kiehl 2006). Part of the limbic 
system, the amygdala is a pair of small almond-shaped nodes deep in the brain (see 
Figure 1) and contribute, among other things, to assessing the significance of a 
stimulus, such as whether it is threatening, which plays a crucial role in learning. 
Unlike adults who acquire damage to vmPFC or amygdala (Anderson et al. 1999; 
Taber-Thomas et al. 2014), psychopathic traits are associated with abnormal 
structure and functioning in these regions (Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong 2013; Glenn 
& Raine 2014), whether due to unfortunate genes (e.g. alleles known to disrupt 
neurotransmitters) or adverse circumstances (e.g. childhood trauma, neglect, and 
even lead exposure).  
Importantly, individuals with psychopathy do not only behave immorally; 
their understanding of right and wrong seems impaired to some extent. Some, but 
not all, incarcerated psychopaths exhibit some difficulty distinguishing moral rules 
from mere conventions (Aharoni et al. 2012). Interviews also suggest that some 
inmates with psychopathy have an inconsistent and tenuous grasp of moral concepts 
and reasons, particularly when attempting to justify decisions or to use relevant 
emotion words such as “guilt” (Hare 1993; Kennett & Fine 2008). Yet some people 
with psychopathic traits seem rational—indeed all too cold and calculating in their 
apparently skilled manipulation of others—although they do exhibit irrationality 
too, such as delusions of grandeur, poor attention span, and difficulty learning from 
punishment (Maibom 2005; May 2018). Thus, not only do the vmPFC and 
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amygdala seem to be crucial moral circuits, perhaps emotions are necessary for 
moral competence (Prinz 2016). 
 
Figure 1: The Moral Brain 
Brain areas consistently activated when people make moral, compared to non-
moral, judgments. 
 
 
 
1.3 Post-Hoc Rationalization 
Also in the 1990s, moral psychologists began emphasizing gut feelings in moral 
judgment. Imagine being asked whether, hypothetically, it’s morally acceptable for 
someone to clean a toilet with the national flag, to eat a pet that had been run over 
by a car, or to engage in consensual protected intercourse with an adult sibling. 
Most people in studies automatically condemn such “harmless taboo violations” 
without being able to articulate appropriate justifications (Haidt et al. 1993; Stanley 
et al. 2019). Indeed, it seems that we often intuitively regard actions as right or 
wrong first and only afterward does conscious reasoning concoct a defense of it 
(Haidt 2001; Cushman et al. 2006).  
Similar ideas followed studies of split-brain patients, starting around the 
1960s. When the corpus callosum is severed, often to treat seizures from epilepsy, 
the two hemispheres of the brain can no longer communicate with one another. 
Studies of such split-brain patients suggest that, in the absence of crucial 
information from one side of the brain, patients often confabulate a story to make 
sense of their behavior (Gazzaniga 1983). One commissurotomy patient, for 
instance, was tasked with choosing out of a row of eight images which two best 
relates to the two pictures recently presented to him. The catch was that only one 
picture was presented to each eye, and thus each side of the brain could process 
only one of the two pictures first presented. One half of the patient’s brain saw a 
home covered in snow while the other half saw a chicken claw. To go with these, 
the patient almost instinctively chose an image of a snow shovel and an image of a 
chicken head. However, language abilities appear to be partly lateralized to one side 
of the brain, so one hemisphere can’t readily communicate linguistically what it 
saw. As a result, the patient articulated a reason that appeared to be concocted just 
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to make sense of his intuitive choice, saying “you have to clean out the chicken 
shed with a shovel” (534). Recent work suggests callosotomy patients also provide 
confabulations in the context of moral judgments (Miller et al. 2010). 
 
1.4 Lessons 
In light of the above, and other studies in psychology and neuroscience, many 
theorists in the first thread adopted what we might call “sentimentalist” theories of 
moral judgment. Proponents asserted that moral attitudes and decisions are 
generated predominantly by automatic gut feelings, whereas reasoning is largely 
post-hoc rationalization (Haidt 2001; Nichols 2004; Prinz 2016). Now, some of 
these theorists took the evidence to erode the supposed division between reason and 
emotion (e.g. Damasio 1994) but with little emphasis on reasoning, inference, or 
complex computation underlying gut feelings and moral intuitions. 
Sentimentalist theories do reconcile various observations of lesion patients, 
but several limitations remain. First, the centrality of gut feelings is insufficiently 
corroborated. While psychological studies initially appeared to support the 
importance of gut feelings in moral judgment, much of the findings were overblown 
(Huebner 2015; May 2018). One meta-analysis, for example, found limited 
evidence for the famous effect of incidental disgust priming on moral judgment, 
which disappeared entirely after controlling for publication bias (Landy & 
Goodwin 2015). Moreover, the vmPFC is unlikely a source of gut feelings but 
rather a hub wherein such feelings are incorporated with or weighed against other 
considerations before making a decision (Shenhav & Greene 2014; Hutcherson et 
al. 2015). Second, theories focusing on the vmPFC and amygdala are incomplete. 
Brain damage to rather different areas in the frontal and temporal lobes lead to 
moral dysfunction as well—e.g. in frontotemporal dementia. Moreover, as we’ll 
see, subsequent brain imaging studies confirm that additional brain areas are 
integral to moral judgment. Indeed, early research on brain abnormalities often 
study the patient’s social behavior and choice, rather than the moral evaluation of 
other people and their actions. Patients with vmPFC lesions, for example, don’t 
appear to have distinctively moral deficits but rather problems with decision-
making generally.  
 
3. Second Thread: Reasoning 
 
The second thread in moral neuroscience followed the development of 
neuroimaging technologies, which enabled the live, non-invasive measurement of 
brain functioning. Of these technologies, functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) has dominated the methodological landscape. Moreover, partly given 
worries about post-hoc rationalization, researchers primarily investigated the neural 
correlates of moral judgments made in response to particular moral statements 
(Moll et al. 2001) or hypothetical scenarios (Greene et al. 2001). By varying the 
features of hypothetical scenarios, for instance, one can infer which factors shape 
moral judgments, instead of relying on the factors participants articulate as reasons 
for their moral judgments, which may be misleading. 
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3.1 Dual Process 
The second thread arguably began with an influential article published by Joshua 
Greene and his collaborators (2001), in which participants underwent fMRI 
scanning while responding to sacrificial dilemmas familiar from longstanding 
philosophical debates in ethical theory. These hypothetical scenarios pit moral 
values against each other by describing an opportunity to sacrifice one person in 
order to save even more lives (typically five). Interestingly, most people consider 
it morally acceptable to sacrifice one to save five when this can be done in an 
impersonal way, such as diverting a runaway trolley away from five workers stuck 
on one track but onto another track with only one stuck worker (Switch scenario). 
But sacrificing one to save five is deemed unacceptable if the harm must be up close 
and personal, such as pushing someone in front of a trolley to save the five others 
(Footbridge scenario).  
Such sacrificial dilemmas have long been used by philosophers to 
distinguish between and evaluate ethical theories. Treating personal harm as 
immoral, even when it would save more lives, ostensibly reflects characteristically 
“deontological” judgments that align with moral rules (e.g. don’t kill), even if 
violating them would produce better consequences. Sacrificing one to save five, on 
the other hand, ostensibly reflects characteristically “utilitarian” (or 
consequentialist) judgments that privilege the maximization of overall welfare.  
Greene’s (2014) model adopts the tools of dual-process theory , which 
posits the operation of competing psychological processes, particularly automatic 
versus deliberative thinking (e.g. Kahneman 2011). Applying this to the moral 
domain, Greene theorizes that “utilitarian” responses to moral dilemmas are driven 
by controlled, deliberative reasoning while non-utilitarian (“deontological”) 
responses are driven by automatic, intuitive, emotional heuristics that are relatively 
insensitive to the consequences of an action. Some of the support for this dual-
process model comes from psychological experiments but also fMRI. Early on, 
Greene and his collaborators (2001; 2004) reported the engagement of predictably 
different brain areas are engaged when participants respond to personal and 
impersonal moral dilemmas. Compared to impersonal (and non-moral) dilemmas, 
personal dilemmas elicited greater activity in some areas associated with automatic, 
emotional, and social processing—namely, the vmPFC, amygdala, pSTS, and 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Responses to impersonal dilemmas yielded 
greater activity in areas associated with controlled deliberative reasoning—namely, 
the dlPFC and inferior parietal lobe. 
A diverse body of evidence appears to corroborate the dual-process model 
(Greene 2014), but let’s focus on some of the brain science that goes beyond 
neuroimaging. Prior lesion studies appear consistent with the model’s account of 
intuitive moral judgments being driven by gut feelings, but what about the claim 
that characteristically “utilitarian” moral judgments are driven by calculative 
reasoning? Researchers have found, as the model predicts, more “utilitarian” 
responses to dilemmas among people with emotional deficits, such as psychopaths, 
people suffering from frontotemporal dementia, and patients with damage to the 
vmPFC (Koenigs et al. 2012; Mendez et al. 2005; Koenigs et al. 2007). Activity in 
the amygdala correlates negatively with “utilitarian” judgments but positively with 
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adverse feelings in personal moral dilemmas (Shenhav & Greene 2014). Related to 
this finding, people with psychopathic traits appear to exhibit lower amygdala 
activity when responding to personal dilemmas (Glenn et al. 2009). As a final 
example, “utilitarian” responses are lower among participants whose brains had 
been flooded with serotonin, which especially influences the amygdala and vmPFC, 
among some other regions (Crockett et al. 2010). 
 Despite the array of corroborating evidence, there are many criticisms of 
the very dual-process elements of the theory. For example, the personal/impersonal 
distinction, based largely on reaction time data, was driven by a handful of stimuli 
from the complete set of about 60 dilemmas judged by participants (McGuire et al. 
2009). Furthermore, while different reaction speeds—fast or slow—can reflect 
intuitive or deliberative processes, this may be due to the particular examples of 
those types of dilemmas the researchers happened to choose (Krajbich et al. 2015). 
Indeed, moral dilemmas can be constructed that yield “utilitarian” responses that 
are intuitive and “deontological” ones that are counter-intuitive (Kahane et al. 
2012). Another concern is that the automatic versus controlled moral judgments 
measured with sacrificial dilemmas don’t clearly track the relevant moral values or 
types of moral reasoning. Some apparently “utilitarian” resolutions to personal 
dilemmas appear driven by callousness (e.g. indifference to pushing), not a 
utilitarian concern for the greater good (Kahane et al. 2015; but see Conway et al. 
2018).  
Some versions of dual process theory also treat automatic moral intuitions as 
relatively simple and inflexible, which understates how they can be shaped by 
unconscious learning (Railton 2017). Indeed, some neuroimaging evidence 
suggests distinct brain areas underlie the resolution of moral dilemmas in terms of 
factors familiar from moral theory, such as the act/omission distinction and harming 
as a means versus a side effect (Schaich Borg et al. 2006). What seemed like a 
simplistic emotional aversion to pushing or prototypically violent acts in personal 
dilemmas turns out to be driven by complex concerns about how involved an agent 
is in bringing about harmful outcomes (Mikhail 2011; Feltz & May 2017; May 
2018).  
 
3.2 Beyond Dilemmas 
Some neuroscientists have gone beyond sacrificial dilemmas and dual-process 
theory when investigating moral cognition (although they do remain fixated largely 
on harming/helping others). Most of the extant research has extensively studied 
moral judgments about hypothetical scenarios involving attempted versus 
accidental harms. Now, intentionality may not be crucial for all moral situations—
sleeping with your cousin is deemed impure and morally problematic by many 
people, even if you’re completely oblivious to the family connection (Young & 
Saxe 2011). Nevertheless, across cultures, an actor’s mental states (intent, belief, 
knowledge, or lack thereof) influence moral evaluations of harmful acts (Barrett et 
al. 2016; McNamara et al. 2019).  
Liane Young and her collaborators have found that increased activation in 
the TPJ/pSTS is associated with attribution of intent during the evaluation of 
attempted harms (Young et al. 2007; Young & Saxe 2008). One study even decoded 
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activity in this region—using multi-voxel pattern analysis—to predict individual 
differences in moral evaluations of accidental versus intentional harms (Koster-
Hale et al. 2013). Moreover, while “No harm, no foul” usually doesn’t apply to 
attempted murder, disrupting the TPJ with transcranial magnetic stimulation made 
participants judge less harshly an agent’s failed attempt to harm someone, by 
downplaying the agent’s malicious intent and focusing instead on the lack of 
harmful outcomes (Young et al. 2010).  
These findings are consistent with theories suggesting that the TPJ—which 
overlaps with the pSTS—is critical for the domain-general capacity of mental state 
understanding and empathy (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Young & Dungan, 2012). 
Unsurprisingly, some evidence even suggests that patients with high-functioning 
autism have difficulty integrating mental state information into their moral 
judgments of harm, causing them to judge accidental harms more harshly than 
neurotypical individuals do (Moran et al. 2011). Similar results have been found 
with split-brain patients, which coheres with evidence that belief-attribution in the 
TPJ is partly lateralized to the right hemisphere (Miller et al. 2010). 
A different neuroimaging paradigm asks participants to judge statements, 
instead of scenarios, as right or wrong, some of which go beyond harm and even 
fairness (Moll et al. 2001; Moll et al. 2002). While in the scanner, participants 
judged as “right” or “wrong” moral statements (e.g. “The elderly are useless”), non-
moral statements (e.g. “The elderly sleep more at night”), and scrambled statements 
(e.g. “Sons push use eat work.”). The researchers found that moral judgments, 
relative to judgments about non-moral statements, elicited greater activity in brain 
areas now familiar in moral neuroscience:  vmPFC, left temporal pole (highly 
connected to the vmPFC and amygdala), and TPJ/pSTS. 
Studies using electroencephalography (EEG) further suggest a temporal 
order over which various neural circuits contribute to the moral evaluation of 
harmful acts. When forming such moral judgments, participants rapidly computed 
information about mental states in TPJ, around 60 milliseconds after viewing a 
short video depicting accidental or intentional harm (Decety & Cacioppo 2012). 
Just a few hundred milliseconds later, the amygdala provided evaluative input to 
areas of the prefrontal cortex before a moral judgment emerged, whether 
concerning harmful or helpful acts (Yoder & Decety 2014). At least when it comes 
to the domain of harm, the brain appears to compute the positive and negative 
consequences of the act while weighing up how involved an agent was in bringing 
them about. 
 
3.3 Limitations 
One criticism facing much work in the second thread is the overreliance on “reverse 
inference” to infer the existence of certain mental states from activations in brain 
areas, when such areas perform multiple psychological functions (see e.g. Klein 
2010). The amygdala, for example, is associated with among other things 
motivation, fear, and reward; greater activity in the amygdala when participants 
give “deontological” responses to moral dilemmas doesn’t necessarily mean 
participants felt increased motivation as opposed to fear, reward, or perhaps 
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something else entirely by way of functional interactions with other regions at the 
network-level.  
Reverse inference can be warranted, however, if the observation of brain 
activity in some region provides better support for one theory over another 
(Machery 2014). Moreover, as we’ve seen, moral neuroscience does not rely solely 
on neuroimaging but also on other methods that are less susceptible to concerns 
relating to reverse inference. We have seen some appeal to lesion studies, which go 
beyond merely correlating brain areas with moral cognition to provide evidence 
that a region is necessary for moral cognition. Some research is even able to discern 
which areas are necessary and sufficient for moral cognition by employing non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques or psychotropic drugs (or both). Some of the 
studies cited above used transcranial magnetic stimulation, for instance, to increase 
(or decrease) neuronal excitation or medications to enhance (or impair) the 
functioning of neurochemicals such as serotonin. Even the dual-process model, 
despite being born of fMRI, has been tested against brain lesion data and the 
manipulation of neurotransmitters, not to mention various psychological 
experiments. 
Another important limitation is that extant theories are woefully incomplete. 
Much of moral judgment doesn’t involve death or bodily harm, let alone dilemmas 
featuring these moral considerations. Reams of evidence now suggest that across 
cultures fundamental moral values include not just harm or care but also fairness, 
group loyalty, sanctity, and respect for authority (Gilligan 1982; Haidt et al. 1993; 
Doğruyol et al. 2019). Even if these other moral values are ultimately reducible to 
harm/care, moral neuroscientists have largely ignored them (a few exceptions: 
Parkinson et al. 2011; Decety, Pape, & Workman, 2018; Workman, Yoder, & 
Decety 2019). 
 
3.4 Lessons 
The second thread in moral neuroscience primarily examined differences in brain 
activity elicited by moral compared to non-moral stimuli, or to moral stimuli of one 
kind compared to another, which were then localized to specific parts of the brain. 
Combined with lessons from the first thread, a general picture emerges in which at 
least some core aspects of moral cognition are underpinned by a network of 
predominantly frontal and temporal regions dedicated to various morally-relevant 
factors recognizable to both commonsense and moral theorizing (for further 
reviews, see Moll et al. 2005; Greene 2009; Eres et al. 2017; Han 2017; Demaree-
Cotton & Kahane, 2018).  
A central lesson is that moral cognition is not localized to one brain area or 
otherwise particularly unified in the brain (Greene 2009; Young & Dungan 2012; 
Parkinson et al. 2011). Instead, our capacity for moral judgment involves a spatially 
distributed network of areas with various domain-general psychological functions 
that are also relevant to moral evaluation, such as understanding the consequences 
of an agent’s action, the agent’s mental states, how the action was causally brought 
about, and the social norms it violates. 
Another key lesson is that moral judgment is not always driven only by gut 
feelings or localized just to vmPFC and amygdala. In contrast with the first thread, 
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we see that some moral judgments involve rapid reasoning, served by areas such 
as dlPFC and TPJ. Moreover, even automatic moral intuitions can involve complex 
computation (Mikhail 2011). While some moral intuitions are heavily dependent 
on amygdala and vmPFC, these are part of a network of brain areas that engage in 
sophisticated, even if unconscious, learning and inference (Huebner 2015; 
Woodward 2016). 
 
4. Third Thread: Learning 
 
The first and second threads in moral neuroscience focused on brain areas and their 
functions. A third thread focuses on the level of computational analysis in 
neuroscience. In particular, many proponents of this type of approach draw on 
reinforcement learning to illuminate the nature and workings of moral judgment. 
 
4.1 Value, Reward, and Learning  
 
The field of reinforcement learning asks how an agent can learn to optimize its 
behavior strictly from interactions with its environment. For example, a baby plover 
is able to leave the nest and feed itself within a few hours of hatching, receiving 
relatively little assistance from its parents. How is it able to learn and perform these 
behaviors?   
Research in reinforcement learning analyzes idealized versions of this 
question (Sutton & Barto, 2018). Specifically, it recasts the question in terms of 
how an agent can learn to maximize its reward and value over time. Reward refers 
to the intrinsic desirability of a given stimulus, whereas value refers to the total, 
expected, future reward associated with a given state. For example, drinking a cup 
of coffee is intrinsically desirable for many people because it is flavorful and 
provides caffeine, and so is rewarding. By contrast, grinding some coffee by hand 
is not rewarding, and may even be annoying, but it is valuable because it 
subsequently leads to the rewarding state. Many reinforcement learning methods 
use the notions of reward and value to estimate what it would be good for an agent 
to do in the long run.  
The computational study of reward and value extends into the study of the 
neurobiological bases of human decision-making.  An early discovery in 
computational neuroscience revealed an important correspondence between one of 
these reinforcement learning methods, known as the Temporal-Difference learning 
algorithms, and the firing of dopamine neurons in the mammalian brain (Schultz et 
al. 1997). A substantial body of animal and human behavioral evidence has since 
suggested that there are at least three different decision systems in the brain: the 
Pavlovian system, the model-free (or habitual) system, and the model-based (or 
goal-directed) system (e.g., see Glimcher and Fehr 2014).  
The Pavlovian system produces basic, stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses. The term “Pavlovian” frequently leads to confusion (see Rescorla 1988). 
In most fields, as well as in everyday usage, the term is usually associated with 
Pavlov’s original experiments with dogs, where he conditioned dogs to salivate at 
the sound of a bell by repeatedly ringing a bell and then consistently feeding them 
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afterwards. By contrast, in reinforcement learning, “Pavlovian” refers to the 
relationship between the unconditioned stimulus (the food) and the relevant 
unconditioned response (the salivating). Thought to be evolved and roughly 
“hardwired,” these unconditioned responses include both outcome-specific 
responses, such as inflexibly licking water, and more open-ended, valence-
dependent responses, such as generally approaching something rewarding. Both 
classes of response are characteristically recalcitrant to changes in outcome, as 
when chickens will continue to peck at a feeder that will not dispense any seeds 
over hundreds of trials (Macintosh, 1983; Huys et al. 2011, 2012). The Pavlovian 
system is supported primarily by the brain stem and subcortical areas of the limbic 
system—e.g. amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and hypothalamus (Rangel et al. 
2008). 
The model-free system produces instrumental responses by evaluating 
actions based on their previously learned values in different contexts. For example, 
a button-press that has previously resulted in a reward is a good state-action pair, 
while a button-press that has previously resulted in a punishment is a bad state-
action pair. Because the model-free system does not explicitly represent future 
values, it can be slow to update in the face of changing circumstances. However, 
unlike the Pavlovian system, the model free system is not “hardwired,” and does 
gradually update. The model-free system is associated with activity in the basal 
ganglia and the orbital and medial portions of the prefrontal cortex (Yin and 
Knowlton, 2006).  
Finally, the model-based learning system uses a forward-looking model to 
represent possible actions, outcomes, and associated values. This model is typically 
represented by a decision tree. Each node in the tree represents a possible choice, 
where the model-based system “searches” through the decision tree to find the 
branch with the highest total value. For example, a chess player may represent three 
upcoming moves in a game of chess, with each possible move further branching 
into a wide range of subsequent moves. To win, the player tries to represent and 
choose the best possible sequence of moves overall. The model-based system is 
primarily associated with activation in the vmPFC (Hare et al. 2008). 
 
4.2 Moral Learning 
 
Learning-based approaches to moral judgment are developed using the three 
decision-systems. Which system plays a defining role in moral judgment? Echoing 
the dual-process theories discussed in the second thread, Cushman (2013, 2015) 
argues that much of moral cognition depends on a body of objective rules together 
with the model-free decision system (see also Greene 2017). When exhibiting the 
latter process, people often continue to adhere to norms outside of the context in 
which those norms are in play. For instance, American tourists frequently continue 
to tip in restaurants abroad, even when there is no relevant norm dictating that they 
should (2015, 59).  
Cushman argues that the role of the model-free decision system helps 
explain participants’ diverging responses to the Switch and Footbridge scenarios. 
Cushman reasons that people’s tendency to resist harming the single individual in 
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Footbridge is “the consequence of negative value assigned intrinsically to an action: 
direct, physical harm” (2015, 59). That is, participants’ responses may be 
underwritten by the model-free decision-system: since directly harming others has 
reliably elicited punishments in the past, this option represents a bad state-action 
pair, and leads people to reject it as an appropriate course of action.  
One difficulty with Cushman’s general view is that it is in tension with the 
aforementioned evidence suggesting that all three decision systems trade off and 
interact to produce our everyday behaviors. Another, more specific difficulty comes 
from the fact that participants’ avoidance of harm can just as plausibly be explained 
by the role of the evolved, Pavlovian system as can by the role of its model-free 
counterpart. One way to disentangle which system is in effect could be to devise an 
iterative version of the trolley problem. If participants gradually shifted their views 
on the matter, we could say that it was the model-free system; if they did not, we 
could say that it was recalcitrant Pavlovian responding. 
In contrast to Cushman’s highlighting of the role of only one of the three 
decision systems in producing moral judgments, Crockett (2013, 2016) argues that 
all three systems play a role, and even interact in the process of producing a single 
judgment. On Crockett’s view, both the model-free and Pavlovian systems assign 
negative values to actions that cause others harm through physical contact. 
Consequently, when the “votes” of all three systems are tallied up, participants will 
find it morally acceptable to sacrifice one to save five in impersonal dilemmas, but 
not in personal dilemmas. Hence, even the iterative version of Cushman’s view and 
Crockett’s voting explanation provide competing explanations of responses to the 
trolley problem, and so leave open questions for further investigation.  
 
4.3 Lessons 
 
Computational approaches to understanding moral judgment complement rather 
than compete with the first and second threads discussed above. In particular, 
computational approaches complement strictly behavioral and neuroscientific 
accounts by illuminating the relationships between the components of moral 
cognition, using formal mathematical models. Adopting such strategies has the 
further advantage of enabling researchers to leverage additional bodies of research 
from computer science and economics.  
Notably, this third thread in the neuroscience of morality coheres with the 
suggestion commonly found in other threads that we use domain-general decision-
making systems to make specifically moral judgments. It seems we use the same 
algorithms and neural mechanisms to make, for example, choices about which car 
to buy and decisions about which people to blame for moral wrongdoing (see Berns 
et al. 2012; Shenhav and Greene 2010; Crockett et al. 2017). This emerging picture 
is also consistent with findings in the first thread which suggest that breakdowns in 
general decision-making are associated with related breakdowns in moral decision-
making (Blair et al. 2001; Mahmut et al. 2008; Aharoni et al. 2012). 
Limitations found in previous threads, however, remain, including the 
ongoing reliance on sacrificial dilemmas. Going forward, computational 
approaches will need to model more than judgments about dilemmas and go beyond 
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the domain of harm by studying loyalty, care, and other values that arise in 
everyday circumstances. 
 
5. Future Directions: Moral Development 
 
Moral learning is a process that occurs over time and stretches back to the critical 
period of childhood. We saw in Section 2 that psychopathy involves dysfunction of 
at least amygdala and vmPFC, presumably early in development (Glenn & Raine 
2014; Taber-Thomas et al. 2014), which seems to affect one’s moral capacities. In 
contrast, moral deficits are much less profound in patients who acquire damage to 
these regions in adulthood, because normal brain development affords the 
acquisition of moral competence. Psychopathy is only one form of moral 
dysfunction, however, and we should seek a complete understanding of normal 
moral development that incorporates not only empathy and compassion but also 
harm (including the weighing of outcomes and the actor’s intent) and other moral 
values (e.g. loyalty). Neuroscientists are increasingly interested in understanding 
how such elements of moral cognition work and develop in the brains of children 
and adolescents.  
 
5.1 Moral Judgment and Brain Development 
As in other areas of neuroscience, we do well to consider brain development in 
conjunction with relevant psychological theories and evidence. Building on work 
by Piaget (1932), Kohlberg and his colleagues theorized the development of moral 
cognition in terms of reasoning and reflection that, once fully developed, employed 
universal principles that could even be used to question existing conventions in 
society (Kohlberg 1984).  
An important concern, however, is that this approach only tracks the 
development of conscious moral reasoning, which could be merely rationalizing 
moral judgments one has already made intuitively on different grounds (Haidt 
2001). If we seek a theory of moral judgment, not of our (often poor) attempts to 
justify them verbally, then we need to explain the development of unconscious 
processes that generate automatic moral intuitions (Cushman et al. 2006).  
Taking this approach, researchers have investigated moral development 
with age-appropriate moral scenarios. Using morality plays with puppets, for 
example, researchers have found that even infants discriminate and prefer a puppet 
that help other characters achieve, as opposed to hinder, their goals (Hamlin 2015; 
Cowell & Decety 2015). Children as young as four begin making moral judgments 
focused on outcomes, such as whether an action harmed or saved more people 
(Pellizzoni et al. 2010), regardless of whether it was accidental or intentional. The 
intent of the actor appears to grow increasingly relevant in the next few years of 
development (Cushman et al. 2013).  
Corresponding to the psychological research, studies in developmental 
neuroscience have found relevant differences in brain structure and function across 
age groups during moral cognition. One neuroimaging study, for example, found 
greater activity in vmPFC in adults, compared to younger participants, when they 
viewed moral relative to non-moral transgressions (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler 
May et al. | Neuroscience of Moral Judgment 
2012). Among older participants, the researchers also observed greater task-based 
functional connectivity between the vmPFC and amygdala, and between the 
vmPFC and TPJ/pSTS. Consistent with other studies, younger participants’ 
evaluations of a person who caused harm were less sensitive to whether the harm 
was intentional or accidental. In another study, when both adolescent and adult 
males evaluated images of moral violations, researchers found greater activity in 
the TPJ/pSTS and PCC among older participants (Harenski et al. 2012). In their 
review of these and other studies, Decety and Cowell conclude that “mature moral 
cognition” at least requires continued development in brain areas that underlie 
“aversion to interpersonal harm, empathic concern, and mental state 
understanding” (2018, 160). 
Further research is needed, but studies in developmental neuroscience thus 
far fit well with the moral circuits identified in adulthood. Central players include 
limbic regions (particularly the amygdala), portions of the prefrontal cortex 
(especially vmPFC), and relevant areas of the temporal lobe (namely, the STS, 
including its posterior/TPJ). Brain activity in these moral circuits changes over the 
course of development, and such changes are associated with key elements of moral 
cognition, particularly: assigning value to outcomes such as harm, representation 
of the actor’s knowledge or intentions, and retrieval of relevant social information. 
However, again, morality involves more than harm or even fairness (Gilligan 1982; 
Haidt et al. 1993; Doğruyol et al. 2019). Further developmental neuroscience 
research should study more than simplistic depictions of harm, altruism, or 
compassion and make sure their findings generalize to, say, fraud, torture, betrayal, 
and filial duties. 
 
5.2 Integrative Approaches 
The neuroscience of moral development also suggests an interesting overlap 
between regions that support moral cognition and regions that support thinking 
about the self. Meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies reveal that several moral 
circuits—e.g. the vmPFC and PCC—overlap with the default mode network 
(Bzdok et al. 2012; Eres et al. 2017; Sevinc & Spreng 2014; Han 2017). In many 
studies, participants are asked to evaluate other people and their actions, so it’s 
striking to find such extensive overlap with self-related regions.  
One explanation for this is that participants often make moral judgments in 
response to emotionally-charged stories with actors who intend to cause harm, 
which naturally recruits brain areas that contribute to understanding narratives, 
theory of mind, and distinguishing self from other. However, another explanation 
is that, while moral judgment and motivation are distinguishable, they are 
intimately connected, especially in normal development. Extensive interview 
studies do suggest the integration of moral values and one’s self-concept occurs 
throughout adolescence and into adulthood (Damon 1984). Moreover, we’ve seen 
that psychopathy affects moral cognition not only by causing dysfunction in areas 
associated with conscious reasoning or social knowledge, but emotion and 
motivation.  
Thus, it may be that a brain develops normal moral judgment only through 
proper development of a suite of connected moral capacities, including emotions, 
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motivation, and identity. An analogy may help. Suppose that in educated adults the 
ability to solve algebraic equations is localized, more or less, to the prefrontal 
cortex. It doesn’t follow that a child can learn algebra so long as the prefrontal 
cortex is functioning properly. If other areas are dysfunctional during 
development—even including swaths of motor or primary visual cortex—one may 
be unable to properly develop their mathematical capacity, even if this is later 
grounded in only one of the many brain areas necessary for initial development. 
One approach would be to integrate moral judgment, motivation, and 
behavior via moral identity, or the degree to which moral values are central to one’s 
self-concept (Aquino & Reed II 2002). Experimental evidence suggests that people 
are more likely to behave according to their moral judgments if they regard moral 
values as both central to themselves and more important than non-moral values 
(Reed et al. 2007; Winterich et al. 2013). Qualitative studies corroborate the idea 
that strong moral identity is required for sustained commitment to moral behavior 
(Colby & Damon 1992). Psychopathy may even involve weak moral identity, since 
people with psychopathic tendencies have been shown to report weaker moral 
identities (Glenn et al. 2010).  
Another integrative approach, which is rather mainstream in moral 
education (Han 2014), is neo-Kohlbergian. Unlike classical Kohlbergian theory, 
which focused only on moral judgment and reasoning, the Four Components Model 
incorporates additional aspects of moral functioning (Bebeau 2002)—namely, 
moral motivation, character, and sensitivity. On this model, moral development and 
maintenance involves orchestrating these four components to cooperate with each 
other (Rest & Narvaez 1994), which are associated with interactions among various 
limbic and frontal regions (Narvaez & Vaydich 2008). 
We can perhaps situate integrative developmental theories within 
integrative models of the neurobiology of mature moral judgment. The Event-
Feature-Emotion framework (Moll et al. 2005), for example, identifies a spatially 
distributed network of frontal, temporal, and subcortical brain areas involved not 
just in the moral evaluation of others but also in moral emotion and motivation. 
Such frameworks cohere with the meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies 
suggesting that moral circuits significantly overlap with self-related psychological 
processing (Han 2017). Thus, when it comes to the development of moral cognition 
and its improvement in adulthood, it is wise to consider the integration of otherwise 
dissociable moral capacities, including both moral judgment and motivation (May 
2018). 
 
6. Conclusion: Philosophical Implications 
 
The neuroscience of moral judgment is still fairly young. There is no doubt that 
conclusions about moral judgment on the basis of neurobiology should be drawn 
with caution. Nevertheless, in this final section, we aim to show how combining 
brain science with philosophical analysis can aid our understanding of moral 
judgment, particularly by elucidating concrete mechanisms and corroborating or 
disconfirming theories developed in other areas of cognitive science (Prinz 2016; 
Demaree-Cotton & Kahane 2018).  
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Indeed, the neuroscience of ethics is already greatly improving, due to 
philosophy and science continuously informing one another. We’ve already seen 
how decades of ethical theorizing about the trolley problem, for instance, has 
shaped experimental paradigms. In this section, however, let’s conclude by briefly 
drawing out how the advances in neuroscience discussed above can contribute to 
debates in moral philosophy.  
 
6.1 Reason vs. Emotion in Ethics  
The dichotomy between reason and emotion stretches back to antiquity. But an 
improved understanding of the brain has, arguably more than psychological 
science, questioned the dichotomy (Huebner 2015; Woodward 2016). Brain areas 
associated with prototypical emotions, such as vmPFC and amygdala, are also 
necessary for complex learning and inference, even if largely automatic and 
unconscious. Even psychopaths, often painted as the archetype of emotionless 
moral monsters, have serious deficits in learning and inference. Moreover, even if 
our various moral judgments about trolley problems, harmless taboo violations, and 
the like are often automatic, they are nonetheless acquired through sophisticated 
learning mechanisms that are responsive to morally-relevant reasons (Railton 2017; 
Stanley et al. 2019). Indeed, normal moral judgment often involves gut feelings 
being attuned to relevant experience and made consistent with our web of moral 
beliefs (May & Kumar 2018). 
Blurring the line between reason and emotion may seem to render the 
corresponding philosophical disputes meaningless, but that’s too fast. If emotions 
are required for moral judgment only because affect is integral to reasoning 
generally, then moral judgment isn’t special in requiring emotional processes, 
which is a core tenant of sentimentalism. Instead, what seems vindicated is a core 
thesis of rationalism: that moral cognition involves domain-general capacities for 
learning and reasoning, just like non-moral cognition. Rather than obliterate the 
philosophical dispute, the evidence may support sophisticated form of rationalism 
(May 2018), despite early proclamations that the science preferentially supports 
sentimentalism.  
 
6.2 Moral Knowledge (or Lack Thereof)  
A consensus already seems to be emerging that, under the skull’s hood, moral 
cognition is a complex affair, not just among ethicists and the intelligentsia but also 
ordinary people. Moral judgment is not merely a matter of expressing one’s 
emotions, divorced from reasoning. Moralizing is informed at least by one’s own 
experiences as well as knowledge from one’s society and ancestors, in the form of 
cultural norms and evolved predispositions. Yet moral beliefs are not fixed after 
maturation. Even staunchly held moral attitudes, such as opposition to same-sex 
marriage, can rapidly change in response to greater understanding of others and 
consistency reasoning (Campbell & Kumar 2012). 
However, even if most moral cognition involves learning and inference, 
these may be too biased and unreliable to yield moral knowledge or justified belief. 
By helping to uncover the causal sources of moral cognition, neuroscience can aid 
in either debunking or vindicating certain kinds of moral beliefs (Greene 2017; 
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Kumar 2017), although sweeping conclusions about all moral cognition are likely 
to falter (May 2018; Kumar & May 2019). Of course, neuroscience alone can’t 
settle philosophical issues without making normative assumptions (Berker 2009), 
but together they can advance debates in ethics. 
 
6.3 Moral Education and Progress 
Understanding the workings of mature moral judgment, as well as its development, 
also promises to illuminate how we can improve the acquisition of moral 
knowledge and perhaps even speed up moral progress. Extant evidence already 
suggests that mature moral judgment requires the proper development of an 
interwoven tapestry of moral capacities, including appropriate reasoning, 
sentiments, motivations, learning mechanisms, and self-conception. 
Of course, neuroscience alone is unlikely to demonstrate how to improve 
our moral selves. But such findings can suggest useful directions for moral 
psychology and moral education, especially when applied to a particular social 
context. For example, given the association between morality and identity at the 
neural level, Han and his colleagues (2017) predicted and found that stories of 
closely related moral exemplars, such as peers, more effectively promoted moral 
elevation and emulation than stories of distant exemplars, such as historical figures 
(see also Han, Workman, Dawson, & May 2018). Or consider more newfangled 
proposals for moral improvement, such as indiscriminately amplifying moral 
emotions—whether through pills, brain stimulation, or lacing the water with 
oxytocin (Earp, Douglas, & Savulescu 2017). The neuroscience of moral judgment 
already speaks against such tactless tactics. Of course, devastating a person’s moral 
capacities may be as simple as disrupting moral circuits in childhood—
unfortunately, it’s generally easier to harm than to benefit (Persson & Savulescu 
2012). But distinguishing right from wrong is an incredibly complex process that 
requires the coordinated orchestration of a diverse range of brain areas and 
neurotransmitters. Novel neurobiological methods for moral improvement will 
certainly require finesse. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
For helpful feedback on this chapter, we thank the editors and other contributors to this volume, 
as well as Vanessa Bentley, Jean Decety, Andrea Glenn, and Andrew Morgan. Special thanks 
to Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for directing the Summer Seminars in 
Neuroscience and Philosophy and to the John Templeton Foundation for funding them. 
Authorship: JH wrote Section 4; HH wrote section 5; JM and CW co-authored the remaining 
sections and edited the entire manuscript. 
 
 
  
May et al. | Neuroscience of Moral Judgment 
References 
 
Aharoni, E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Can psychopathic offenders 
discern moral wrongs? A new look at the moral/conventional distinction. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 121(2), 484–497. 
Allen, C., & Wallach, W. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, S. W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1999). Impairment 
of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex. 
Nature Neuroscience 2(11), 1032–1037.  
Aquino, K., & Reed II, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 83(6), 1423–1440. 
Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittendend, A. N., Fessler, D. M. T., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M., 
et al. (2016). Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of 
intentions in moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
113(17), 4688–4693. 
Bebeau, M. J. (2002). The defining issues test and the four component model: contributions to 
professional education. Journal of moral education, 31, 271–295.  
Berker, S. (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
37(4), 293–329.  
Berns, G. S., Bell, E., Capra, C. M., Prietula, M. J., Moore, S., Anderson, B., ... & Atran, S. 
(2012). The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation 
of sacred values. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 367(1589), 754-762. 
Blair, R. J. R. (2007). The amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in morality and 
psychopathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(9), 387–392. 
Bzdok, D., Schilbach, L., Vogeley, K., Schneider, K., Laird, A. R., Langner, R., & Eickhoff, 
S. B. (2012). Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on 
morality, theory of mind, and empathy. Brain Structure and Function, 217, 783–796.  
Campbell, R., & Kumar, V. (2012). Moral Reasoning on the Ground. Ethics, 122(2), 273–312. 
Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care : contemporary lives of moral commitment. 
New York, NY: Free Press. 
Conway, P., Goldstein-Greenwood, J., Polacek, D., & Greene, J. D. (2018). Sacrificial 
utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process 
dissociation and the judgments of philosophers. Cognition, 179(June), 241–265. 
Cowell, J. M., & Decety, J. (2015). Precursors to Morality in Development as a Complex 
Interplay between Neural, Socioenvironmental, and Behavioral Facets. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 112(41): 12657–12662. 
Crockett, M. J. (2013). Models of morality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 363–366. 
Crockett, M. J. (2016). How formal models can illuminate mechanisms of moral judgment and 
decision making. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25(2), 85-90. 
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010). Serotonin selectively 
influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(40), 17433–17438.  
Crockett, M. J., Siegel, J. Z., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2017). Moral 
transgressions corrupt neural representations of value. Nature neuroscience, 20(6), 
879. 
Cushman, F. (2013). Action, outcome, and value: A dual-system framework for 
morality. Personality and social psychology review, 17(3), 273-292. 
Cushman, F. (2015). From moral concern to moral constraint. Current opinion in behavioral 
sciences, 3, 58-62. 
May et al. | Neuro Moral Cognition 
Page 19 of 23 
Cushman, F. A., Young, L. L., & Hauser, M. D. (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and 
Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, Psychological 
Science, 17(12), 1082–1089. 
Cushman, F. A., Sheketoff, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013). The development of intent-
based moral judgment. Cognition, 127(1), 6–21. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: 
Avon Books.  
Damon, W. (1984). Self-understanding and moral development from childhood to adolescence. 
In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior and moral 
development (pp. 109–127). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Decety, J., & Cacioppo, S. (2012). The speed of morality: a high-density electrical 
neuroimaging study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 108(11), 3068–3072. 
Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2018). Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for 
morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective. Development and 
Psychopathology, 30(1), 153–164. 
Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2007). The role of the right temporoparietal junction in social 
interaction: How low-level computational processes contribute to meta-cognition. The 
Neuroscientist, 13(6), 580–593.  
Decety, J., Pape, R., & Workman, C. I. (2018). A multilevel social neuroscience perspective 
on radicalization and terrorism. Social Neuroscience, 13(5), 511–529.  
Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, K. D. (2012). The contribution of emotion and 
cognition to moral sensitivity: a neurodevelopmental study. Cerebral cortex 22(1), 
209–20. 
Demaree-Cotton, J., & Kahane, G. (2018). The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment. In A. Z. 
Zimmerman, K. Jones, & M. Timmons (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral 
Epistemology. Routledge.  
Doğruyol, B., Alper, S., & Yilmaz, O. (2019). The five-factor model of the moral foundations 
theory is stable across WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 151, 109547. 
Earp, B. D., Douglas, T., & Savulescu, J. (2017). Moral neuroenhancement. In The Routledge 
Handbook of Neuroethics, L. S. Johnson, K. S. Rommelfanger (eds.). Routledge, pp. 
166-184. 
Eres, R., Louis, W. R., & Molenberghs, P. (2017). Common and distinct neural networks 
involved in fMRI studies investigating morality: an ALE meta-analysis. Social 
Neuroscience, 1–15.  
Feltz, A., & May, J. (2017). The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-
analysis. Cognition, 166, 314–327.  
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1983). Right Hemisphere Language Following Brain Bisection. American 
Psychologist, 38(5), 525–537.  
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. 
Harvard University Press.  
Glenn, A. L., Koleva, S., Iyer, R., Graham, J., & Ditto, P. H. (2010). Moral identity in 
psychopathy. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(7), 497–505. 
Glenn, A. L., & Raine, A. (2014). Psychopathy. New York University Press. 
Glenn, A. L., Raine, A., & Schug, R. A. (2009). The neural correlates of moral decision-making 
in psychopathy. Molecular Psychiatry, 14(1), 5–6.  
Glimcher, P. W., & Fehr, E. (Eds.). (2014). Neuroeconomics: Decision making and the brain. 
New York: Academic Press.  
Greene, J. D. (2009). The cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), 
The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 987-999. 
Greene, J. D. (2014). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality. Ethics, 124(4), 695–726. 
Greene, J. D. (2017). The rat-a-gorical imperative: Moral intuition and the limits of affective 
learning. Cognition, 167, 66-77.  
May et al. | Neuroscience of Moral Judgment 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The Neural 
Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389–400.  
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 
2105–2108.  
Haidt, J. (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–
834. 
Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to 
Eat Your Dog. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(4), 613–628. 
Hamlin, J. K. (2015). The Infantile Origins of Our Moral Brains. The Moral Brain, J. Decety 
and T. Wheatley (eds.). MIT Press, pp. 105-122.  
Han, H. (2014). Analysing Theoretical Frameworks of Moral Education through Lakatos’s 
Philosophy of Science. Journal of Moral Education, 43(1), 32–53. 
Han, H. (2017). Neural correlates of moral sensitivity and moral judgment associated with brain 
circuitries of selfhood: A meta-analysis. Journal of Moral Education, 46(2), 97–113. 
Han, H., Kim, J., Jeong, C., & Cohen, G. L. (2017). Attainable and Relevant Moral Exemplars 
Are More Effective than Extraordinary Exemplars in Promoting Voluntary Service 
Engagement. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 283. 
Han, H., Workman, C., Dawson, K. J., & May, J. (2018) “Which Stories of Moral Exemplars 
Best Provoke Moral Behavior?” Presentation at the 44th Annual Conference of 
Association for Moral Education, Barcelona, Spain. 
Hare, R. D. (1993). Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us. 
Guilford Press.  
Hare, T. A., O'Doherty, J., Camerer, C. F., Schultz, W., & Rangel, A. (2008). Dissociating the 
role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computation of goal values and 
prediction errors. Journal of neuroscience, 28(22), 5623-5630. 
Harenski, C. L., Harenski, K. A., Shane, M. S., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Neural development of 
mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence to adulthood. Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience 2, 162–173.  
Howard, D., & Muntean, I. (2017). Artificial moral cognition: moral functionalism and 
autonomous moral agency. In Philosophy and Computing (pp. 121-159). Springer, 
Cham. 
Huebner, B. (2015). Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition? Topoi, 34(2), 
427–440. 
Hutcherson, C. A., Montaser-Kouhsari, L., Woodward, J., & Rangel, A. (2015). Emotional and 
utilitarian appraisals of moral dilemmas are encoded in separate areas and integrated 
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(36), 12593-12605.  
Huys, Q. J., Cools, R., Gölzer, M., Friedel, E., Heinz, A., Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2011). 
Disentangling the roles of approach, activation and valence in instrumental and 
Pavlovian responding. PLoS computational biology, 7(4), e1002028. 
Huys, Q. J., Eshel, N., O'Nions, E., Sheridan, L., Dayan, P., & Roiser, J. P. (2012). Bonsai trees 
in your head: how the Pavlovian system sculpts goal-directed choices by pruning 
decision trees. PLoS computational biology, 8(3), e1002410. 
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015). “Utilitarian” 
judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater 
good. Cognition, 134(C), 193–209. 
Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2012). The neural 
basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 7(4), 393–402. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
Kennett, J., & Fine, C. (2008). Internalism and the Evidence from Psychopaths and “Acquired 
Sociopaths.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press, 
pp. 173–190.  
May et al. | Neuro Moral Cognition 
Page 21 of 23 
Kiehl, K. A. (2006). A cognitive neuroscience perspective on psychopathy: Evidence for 
paralimbic system dysfunction. Psychiatry Research, 142(2-3), 107–128. 
Kiehl, K. & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. eds. (2013). Handbook of Psychopathy and Law. Oxford 
University Press.  
Klein, C. (2010). Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging. Philosophy Compass, 5(2), 186–198. 
Koenigs, M., Kruepke, M., Zeier, J., & Newman, J. P. (2012). Utilitarian moral judgment in 
psychopathy. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 708–714. 
Koenigs, M., Young, L. L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F. A., Hauser, M. D., & 
Damasio, A. R. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral 
judgements, Nature 446(7138), 908–911. 
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: the nature and validity of moral 
stages. San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
Koster-Hale, J., Saxe, R., Dungan, J., & Young, L. L. (2013). Decoding Moral Judgments from 
Neural Representations of Intentions. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 110(14), 5648–5653.  
Krajbich, I., Bartling, B., Hare, T., & Fehr, E. (2015). Rethinking fast and slow based on a 
critique of reaction-time reverse inference. Nature Communications, 6(1), 7455. 
Kumar, V. (2017). Moral Vindications. Cognition, 167(Oct), 124–134. 
Kumar, V. & May, J. (2019). How to Debunk Moral Beliefs. J. Suikkanen & A. Kauppinen 
(eds.), The New Methods of Ethics. 
Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence, Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 10(4), 518–536. 
Macintosh, N.J. (1983). Conditioning and associative learning. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Macmillan, M. (2000). An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage. MIT Press. 
Machery, E. (2014). In Defense of Reverse Inference. The British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 65(2), 251–267. 
Maibom, H. L. (2005). Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy. Mind & Language 20(2), 
237–257. 
Mahmut, M. K., Homewood, J., & Stevenson, R. J. (2008). The characteristics of non-criminals 
with high psychopathy traits: Are they similar to criminal psychopaths?. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 42(3), 679-692. 
May, J. (2018). Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind. Oxford University Press. 
May, J. & Kumar, V. (2018). “Moral Reasoning and Emotion.” The Routledge Handbook of 
Moral Epistemology, eds. K. Jones, M. Timmons, & A. Zimmerman, Routledge.  
McGuire, J., Langdon, R., Coltheart, M., & Mackenzie, C. (2009). A reanalysis of the 
personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(3), 577–580. 
McNamara, R. A., Willard, A. K., Norenzayan, A., & Henrich, J. (2019). Weighing Outcome 
vs. Intent Across Societies: How Cultural Models of Mind Shape Moral Reasoning. 
Cognition, 182, 95–108.  
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005). An Investigation of Moral Judgement in 
Frontotemporal Dementia. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18(4), 193–197. 
Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition. Cambridge University Press.  
Miller, M. B., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L. L., King, D., Paggi, A., Fabri, M., et al. 
(2010). Abnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy patients. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(7), 2215–2220. 
Moll, J., Eslinger, P. J., & Oliveira-Souza, R. de. (2001). Frontopolar and anterior temporal 
cortex activation in a moral judgment task: preliminary functional MRI results in 
normal subjects. Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria, 59(3B), 657–664. 
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Bramati, I. E., & Grafman, J. (2002). Functional Networks in 
Emotional Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments, NeuroImage 16(3), 696–703. 
May et al. | Neuroscience of Moral Judgment 
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005). The Neural Basis 
of Human Moral Cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10), 799-809. 
Moran, J. M., Young, L. L., Saxe, R., Lee, S. M., O’Young, D., Mavros, P. L., & Gabrieli, J. 
D. (2011). Impaired Theory of Mind for Moral Judgment in High-Functioning Autism. 
PNAS, 108(7), 2688–2692. 
Narvaez, D., & Vaydich, J. L. (2008). Moral Development and Behaviour Under the Spotlight 
of the Neurobiological Sciences. Journal of Moral Education, 37(3), 289–312. 
Nichols, S. (2004). Sentimental Rules. Oxford University Press.  
Padoa-Schioppa, C., & Schoenbaum, G. (2015). Dialogue on economic choice, learning theory, 
and neuronal representations. Current opinion in behavioral sciences, 5, 16-23. 
Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P. E., Mendelovici, A., McGeer, V., & 
Wheatley, T. (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems 
Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23(10), 3162–3180. 
Pellizzoni, S., Siegal, M., & Surian, L. (2010). The contact principle and utilitarian moral 
judgments in young children. Developmental Science, 13(2), 265–270. 
Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. 2012. Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement. Oxford 
University Press.  
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. Free Press.  
Prinz, J. J. (2016). Sentimentalism and the Moral Brain. S. M. Liao (ed.) Moral Brains. Oxford 
University Press, pp. 45-73.  
Railton, P. (2017). Moral Learning: Conceptual Foundations and Normative Relevance. 
Cognition, 167(Oct), 172–190.  
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the 
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(7), 
545-556.  
Reed, A., Aquino, K., & Levy, E. (2007). Moral Identity and Judgments of Charitable 
Behaviors. Journal of Marketing 71(1), 178-193. 
Rescorla, R. A. (1988). Pavlovian conditioning: It's not what you think it is. American 
Psychologist 43(3): 151-160. 
Rest, J. R., & Narvaez, D. (1994). Moral development in the professions: Psychology and 
applied ethics. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Robertson, D., Snarey, J., Ousley, O., Harenski, K., Bowman, F. D., Gilkey, R., & Kilts, C. 
(2007). The neural processing of moral sensitivity to issues of justice and care. 
Neuropsychologia, 45(4), 755-766. 
Saver, J. L., & Damasio, A. R. (1991). Preserved access and processing of social knowledge in 
a patient with acquired sociopathy due to ventromedial frontal damage. 
Neuropsychologia, 29(12), 1241–1249.  
Schaich Borg, J., Hynes, C., Van Horn, J., Grafton, S., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006). 
Consequences, action, and intention as factors in moral judgments: An fMRI 
investigation. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 18(5), 803-817. 
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction and 
reward. Science, 275(5306), 1593-1599. 
Sevinc, G., & Spreng, R. N. (2014). Contextual and perceptual brain processes underlying 
moral cognition: A quantitative meta-analysis of moral reasoning and moral emotions. 
PLoS ONE, 9, e87427.  
Shenhav, A., & Greene, J. D. (2010). Moral judgments recruit domain-general valuation 
mechanisms to integrate representations of probability and magnitude. Neuron, 67(4), 
667-677. 
Shenhav, A., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Integrative moral judgment: dissociating the roles of the 
amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 34(13), 4741-
4749. 
May et al. | Neuro Moral Cognition 
Page 23 of 23 
Stanley, M. L., Yin, S., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2019). A Reason-Based Explanation for 
Moral Dumbfounding. Judgment and Decision Making, 14(2), 120–129. 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement learning: An introduction. MIT press. 
Taber-Thomas, B. C., Asp, E. W., Koenigs, M., Sutterer, M., Anderson, S. W., & Tranel, D. 
(2014). Arrested development: early prefrontal lesions impair the maturation of moral 
judgement. Brain, 137(4), 1254–1261. 
Winterich, K. P., Aquino, K., Mittal, V., & Swartz, R. (2013). When moral identity 
symbolization motivates prosocial behavior: the role of recognition and moral identity 
internalization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(5), 759-770 
Woodward, J. (2016). Emotion versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making. In Moral Brains: 
The Neuroscience of Ethics, ed. by S. Matthew Liao. Oxford University Press, pp. 87–
117. 
Workman, C. I., Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2019). The Dark Side of Morality: How Moral 
Convictions Facilitate Support for Political Violence. Manuscript under review. 
Wunderlich, K., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Mapping value based planning and 
extensively trained choice in the human brain. Nature neuroscience, 15(5), 786. 
Yin, H. H., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 7(6), 464. 
Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2014). Spatiotemporal neural dynamics of moral judgment: A high-
density ERP study. Neuropsychologia, 60, 39–45. 
Young, L. L., Camprodon, J. A., Hauser, M. D., Pascual-Leone, A., & Saxe, R. (2010). 
Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation 
reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 107(15), 6753–6758.  
Young, L. L., Cushman, F. A., Hauser, M. D., & Saxe, R. (2007). The Neural Basis of the 
Interaction between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(20), 8235–8240. 
Young, L., & Dungan, J. (2012). Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe 
nowhere. Social neuroscience, 7(1), 1-10. 
Young, L. L., & Saxe, R. (2008). The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral 
Judgment. NeuroImage 40(4), 1912–1920. 
Young, L. L., & Saxe, R. (2011). When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across 
moral domains. Cognition, 120(2), 202–214. 
